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Abstract
This paper has two broad objectives. The rst objective is broadly methodological and deals
with some of the more pertinent estimation issues one should be aware of when study-
ing the impact of health status on economic outcomes. We discuss some alternatives for
constructing counterfactuals when designing health program evaluations such as random-
ization, matching and instrumental variables. Our second objective is to present a review
of the existing evidence on the impact of health interventions on individual welfare.
1 Introduction
There are a number of mechanisms through which health can aect productivity (Strauss
and Thomas 1998; Bloom et al. 2004; Weil 2006). Improved health can have a direct eect
by increasing the productivity of healthy workers, as well as an indirect eect by aecting
savings and investment (Muney and Jayachandran 2008; Yaari 1965). Most of the research
on the indirect eects involves macroeconomic studies of aggregate changes in life-expectancy
on savings, investment, and GDP, whereas the bulk of research on the direct eects of health
policy on the other hand is largely micro-focused. Moreover, this evidence is limited in scope
and generalizability partly because evaluating the impact of health interventions on individual
welfare and productivity involves time lags between the intervention, often made during infancy
or childhoood, and welfare outcomes of interest, such as employment status, usually observed
in adulthood.
A further diculty concerns the reliability of the evidence which is available. While the
connection between income levels and health status has long been recognized as crucial for
economic growth, the causal relationship between income and health is harder to establish.
Plausibly, many economic outcomes of interest (productivity for instance) and an individual's
health status are simultaneously determined. Thus, establishing the causal eects of health
interventions on economic outcomes requires that special attention be paid to identication
strategies.
This paper has two broad objectives. The rst objective is broadly methodological and deals
with some of the more pertinent estimation issues one should be aware of when studying the
impact of health status on economic outcomes. If the analyst wishes to estimate the direction
and magnitude of the impact of a particular program or policy intervention on beneciaries of
the intervention, it is necessary to assess the welfare outcomes of program beneciaries against
some type of counterfactual. The paper begins in section 2 by discussing why the need for
counterfactuals arise in the rst instance. Sections 3-5 then presents some alternatives for con-
structing counterfactuals. We begin in section 3 with the \gold standard\ of randomization
and then move to quasi-experimental matching approaches in section 4. Although methods
like propensity score matching were designed primarily as a solution to problems of identi-
cation in observational studies, the method is most useful when used in a complimentary
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approach separately from other well known non-experimental methods in order to motivate its
use as a solution to the problems of \internal validity" that often compromise otherwise well
designed randomized experiments. Section 5 deals with other non-experimental methods such
as IVs, double-dierencing, and regression discontinuity. Even though the structure of the-
ses estimators are well known, we include a brief outline of them here since these approaches
are potentially quite useful in contexts where the assumptions underlying randomization or
matching do not hold.
Our second objective in this paper is to present a review of the existing evidence on the im-
pact of health interventions on individual welfare. The task of establishing the external validity
of health interventions has to be confronted irrespective of the the underlying methodology
used. Section 6 discusses some of the issues pertinent to external validity. This is followed in
section 7 by a review of how the range of available methods outlined in the preceding sections
has been employed in dierent settings and what is known about the impact of health inter-
ventions on individual productivity. Section 8 concludes the paper with an assessment of where
opportunities for further study might lie.
2 Identication of Program Impact
At the heart of the evaluation problem is the desire to know whether a particular program
or policy intervention has made a dierence in the lives of those individuals or communities
aected by it, and if so, what the magnitude of this impact has been. In order to make this
kind of judgment, it is necessary to assess the welfare outcomes of program beneciaries against
the counterfactual, namely:
(1) How would those people who beneted from an intervention have fared in the absence of
the intervention?
(2) How would those people who were not beneciaries of an intervention have fared in the
presence of the intervention?
More specically, consider the following hypothetical problem: let y1i refer to average out-
comes across all households in a given \community" i if the community has received some
health intervention, and let y0i refer to average outcomes across all households in this same
community i where no intervention took place. We are interested in what dierence the receipt
of treatment has made to the average outcomes of households in this community; i.e., the dif-
ference y1i   y0i. The problem is that we will never have a given community both with and
without treatment at the same time.
Imagine that we have data on many communities, where some communities have received
treatment and others not. If we had this type of data, we could approximate y1i   y0i with
 = E[y1ijT = 1]   E[y0ijT = 0]. This estimate, known as the single-dierence estimate, is
confounded by the presence of selection bias. To see why this is so, imagine that we could
observe the counterfactual E[y0ijT = 1] - i.e., we can compute the average outcome of interest
across all households in non-beneciary communities in an alternative state of the world in which
these communities were part of the beneciary group. Now add and subtract this conditional
mean from the one used previously to give:
 = E[y1ijT = 1]   E[y0ijT = 1]
| {z }
treatment eect
 E[y0ijT = 0] + E[y0ijT = 1]
| {z }
selection bias
The rst term in this expression is what we want to try to isolate: the eect of the intervention
on those that received it. We call this the treatment eect, or more precisely, the average
treatment eect on the treated (ATT). The last two terms together constitute selection bias
and picks up systematic unobservable dierences between treatment and control households.
2The inability to separate out the treatment eect from selection bias is the identication
problem we are confronted with if we simply regress the outcome variable on the treatment
dummy. In this type of model, selection bias arises because the treatment variable is correlated
with unobserved characteristics. A natural solution therefore would seem to use proxy variables
of these unobservables in the outcome regression. Characterizing the problem in this way
suggests that many of the standard techniques that deal with endogenous regressors can be
used as potential solutions. However nding plausible ways of extracting exogenous variation
in treatment status in non-experimental settings often rests on a priori reasoning that might
be contestable or quite specic to some sub-population of the sample aected to participate in
the treatment as a result of the exogenous variable/s such models rely on. We return to these
non-experimental techniques in section 5.
3 Randomization
3.1 Motivation
Randomizing assignment to the treatment group (from a sample of potential participants in a
program) theoretically eliminates the confound from selection bias in estimates of mean impact.
Randomization involves a lottery process. Individuals from some well-dened population are
randomly selected into either the treatment group or the control group. An advantage of
this process is that it removes potential dierences that could exist between the two groups for
which social scientists cannot control, or for which they nd it dicult to control, such as ability,
work ethic, psychological disposition and so forth. Importantly, the observed and unobserved
attributes of individuals in the treatment and control groups prior to the intervention must be
independent of assignment to the treatment or control group. If this condition does not hold,
this will result in dierences in mean outcomes ex-post that would falsely be attributed to the
intervention. However, when randomization is successfully implemented, the treatment eect
is unconfounded since treatment status is randomly allocated. 1
3.2 Internal Validity
Internal validity examines whether the specic design of an evaluation study generates reliable
estimates of counterfactual outcomes in a specic context (Ravallion, 2008). Despite the sim-
plicity involved in randomization, there may be a number of reasons why evaluation estimates
derived from this method lack internal validity. Bias may be introduced owing to selective
compliance with or attrition from the randomly assigned status. This occurs when individuals
assigned to the control group take deliberate action in order to attain the benets of treatment.
For example, if an intervention is regionally based, or school based, individuals in the control
group may actively move schools or locations in order to be counted part of the treatment
group. Dierential attrition in the treatment and control groups will also lead to biased esti-
mates. Since individuals who benet from an intervention may be less likely to drop out of an
evaluation study than those who do not (control, group), this can result in dierential attrition
between control and treatment groups. On the other hand, individuals randomly assigned to
the treatment group may choose not to comply with the treatment (for example, they may
neglect to take their pills, they may choose not to collect a social grant or to utilize a voucher
and so on), or, because they feel healthier, may stop complying with the requirements of the
1It is important bear in mind that random assignment in general does not \eliminate" selection bias because
participation is generally not open to all individuals in a population. Random assignment in such instances only
apply to a subset of the population. Under this sort of scenario, Heckman and Smith (1996) show that estimates
of mean impact will be unbiased because the eect of randomization is to balance the bias between the treated
and not-treated, so that the bias is dierenced out when computing . However, when interest lies in some
other measure of central tendency, or higher order moments of the distribution of impacts, then randomisation
alone does not remove the eect of selection bias on estimates of impact. In this instance, combining social
experimentation with non-experimental methods of dealing with selection bias is a more appropriate strategy.
3programme. 2 Institutional or political factors that delay randomized assignment may also
promote selective attrition (Ravallion, 2008; Heckman and Smith, 1995).
In each case, this leads to a dierence between the actual allocation and the intended
allocation, and to the extent that this is not controlled for, will result in biased estimates of
impact. Program design should try to anticipate this, and put processes in place to minimize
attrition that might occur. In the Balsakhi program, for example, Banerjee et al (2007) ensured
that when students did not appear at schools, the data collectors went to their homes in order
to ensure that they collected the data and could track the individuals. This resulted in lower
attrition from the study.
However, when attrition or selective compliance is present, researchers typically deal with
these kinds of problems through intention to treat models (Imbens and Angrist, 1994), whereby
the dierences in outcomes for treatment and control groups (as per the original assignment)
are scaled up by dividing the dierence in outcomes by the dierence in the probability of
actually receiving treatment in the two groups. This gives an estimate of the average treatment
eect for those induced to participate by randomization (Ravallion, 1995). Importantly, this
diers from the average treatment eect in the population as a whole, where this kind of
selective compliance does not occur. Rather, intention to treat models account for the fact
that individuals who anticipate beneting from a programme may be the most likely to take
advantage of it. Arguably, these may be precisely the kinds of individuals that policy makers
are most interested in.
A second important consideration in critically evaluating impact estimates is the presence
of externalities generated by the programme or intervention itself. Externalities may plague
the credibility of impact evaluation estimates if policy makers or aid agencies reallocate their
spending priorities to compensate some communities or individuals for their non-participation
in the intervention. This is dicult to know but vitally important to keep track of, since
to the extent that such re-allocation of spending priorities may occur, this will in
uence the
magnitude of the impact estimates. In addition, to the extent that an intervention confers
positive externalities on individuals outside of the treatment group, failure to account for these
externalities may lead to an under-estimate of the intervention impact. For example, in the
Miguel and Kremer (2004) study of mass deworming programmes in Kenya, they argue that a
randomized intervention targeted at the individual level in which some children within the same
school were treated while others were not would result in a serous underestimate of treatment
eects, since the control children would enjoy reduced disease transmission by virtue of being
in contact with treated children. 3 Hence, they chose to randomize at the school level.
The presence of externalities generated by an intervention thus points to the need for careful
thought to be given about the level at which randomization should occur as well as the need to
collect detailed information to control for these possible spillovers in arriving at credible impact
estimates. For example, despite randomizing at the school level, Miguel and Kremer (2004)
still nd evidence of positive spillovers in the deworming project in that children attending
neighbouring non-treatment schools also enjoy reduced incidence of intestinal worms through
reduced transmission of disease when interacting with children in treatment schools. Since
detailed spatial information about the distance between schools was collected as part of the
evaluation survey, Miguel and Kremer (2004) are able to utilize this data to control for these
spillovers.
Thus, the choice of observational unit should re
ect likely spillover eects (Ravallion, 2005).
2Not only does partial compliance by individuals holds implications for the credibility of the impact estimates,
but it also holds implications for sampling. For example if there were to be approximately an 80% level of
compliance by the treated group, then the entire sample would have to be approximately 50% larger in order to
get commensurable eects relative to a group that had 100% compliance. Thus, in designing a study, one has
to weigh up the costs and benets between a study that requires high compliance rates but lower sample sizes
relative to a program with lower compliance levels but requiring larger sample sizes in order to have the same
level of power from the results. It may happen that a more comprehensively considered program with higher
(predicted) compliance levels might in fact be less expensive to implement than a project with lower compliance
levels.
3Similarly, failure to account for negative externalities imposed by an intervention would result in an over-
estimate of the programmes benets.
4Once this decision has been made, it is important to ensure that the sample size is as large as
possible at the level at which the randomization has occurred. For example, if randomization
has occurred at a group level (e.g. school), it is important to have as large a sample of schools
as possible. It is not the case that increasing the sample size of individuals within a school gives
more power to the evaluation. Rather, at the margin, the evaluator will gain more information
from the addition of a cluster or group (in this case, school) than they will through the addition
of a new individual to an already existing group. This is because individuals within a given
community or school could all negatively (positively) be aected by some shock, with the
consequence that their individual outcomes could be correlated as a result. The addition of
new groups helps to cater for the possibility of intra-group shocks that could aect a number
of individuals in a signicant manner.
Randomization bias may also plague impact assessment estimates (Heckman and Smith,
1995). This arises if there is a signicant dierence in the kinds of individuals who would choose
to participate in a programme compared to those individuals who are randomly assigned to
participate in a programme. Consequently, the intervention that is evaluated is dierent than
the intervention that is implemented in practice, making it dicult to know what to make of
the estimates (Ravallion, 2008).
Finally, randomized evaluations may confront ethical objections that the method of ran-
domization by its very nature will exclude some individuals that could potentially benet from
the intervention, and will include some individuals in the treatment group that do not need the
intervention as much. These objections may be combined with political concerns over service
delivery to the electorate. While ethical objections should be addressed, the short-term loss of
being excluded from the benets of an intervention may be small in relation to the long-term
benets once a programme that has been properly evaluated is implemented and scaled up
(Ravallion, 2008). Moreover, randomization may be the fairest method of allocating scarce
resources, when it is simply not possible to deliver a programme to everyone. For example, the
PROGRESSA programme, launched in 1998, provided social grants to households conditional
on the enrollment and attendance of children at school, and their participation in preventative
health care programmes. Since budget constraints made it impossible to reach all of the 50 000
potential beneciary communities, the Mexican government made a conscious choice to begin
with a pilot project of 506 communities, of which, half were randomly selected to receive the
grants while the others did not (Gertler and Boyce, 2001). The project was later scaled up
considerably.
4 Propensity Score Matching
When randomization is not practically or politically feasible, or when the results from a ran-
domized intervention are not internally valid, more appropriate counterfactuals can be found
by matching treatment households to control households. The ideal approach is to match
treated household to control households directly on their characteristics (see for example An-
grist (1998)) but this approach is often not practical when some of the more important variables
we wish to condition on are continuous, or when the number of covariates we wish to match on
is of large dimension.
Propensity score matching is a useful alternative to exact matching. The idea here is to
match not on the multidimensional vector of covariates but rather on a scalar index (propensity
score) of predicted probabilities computed from a regression where the outcome variable is a
binary indicator of treatment (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman and Robb, 1985;
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999).4
Formally, if we let x be a vector of pre-treatment variables, then we can dene the propensity
4Hirano and Imbens (2004) provide a generalization of this approach to the case where treatment is not
binary but continuous. This approach is potentially quite useful for many health interventions where one would
be interested in not only the eect of treatment but the dosage of treatment among the treated (e.g., ARV
treatment).
5score as the conditional probability of receiving the treatment T, given x
p(x) = Pr[T = 1jx] = E[Tjx]
For the purposes of the analysis to follow, two key results rst introduced by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) are noteworthy:
Lemma 1 (Balance): If p(x) is the propensity score, then x ? Tjp(x). Stated dierently, the
distribution of the covariates for treatment and control is the same once we condition on the
propensity score: F(xjT = 1;P(x)) = F(xjT = 0;P(x))
Lemma 2 (Ignorability): If there is no omitted variable bias once x is controlled for, then
assignment to treatment is unconfounded given the propensity score.
The rst result says that once we condition on the propensity score, assignment to the
treatment group is random. In other words, for two identical propensity scores, there should
be no statistically signicant dierences in the associated x vector, independent of how these
scores are distributed between the treatment group and the control group. This property must
be met if we are to move forward after computing the propensity score.
The second result says that selection into treatment depends only on what we can observe,
i.e., x. In other words, while the propensity score balances the data (i.e., removes the in
uence
of the observables on assignment to the treatment group), it also assumes no confounding on
the basis of unobservables. Whether or not this assumption is plausible rests on whether the
specication of the propensity score regression accurately re
ects the key factors that might
in
uence the process of treatment assignment.
A key challenge in getting the right specication for the propensity score is making sure
that the balancing property is satised. Practically speaking, the balancing property of the
propensity score implies that we need to make sure that the control group and beneciary
group are not statistically dierent from each other, once we've conditioned on x. This requires
that we check that E(p(x)jT = 1) = E(p(x)jT = 0) as well as that x ? Tijp(x). One way to
accomplish this test is to aggregate the estimated propensity score ^ p(x), into mutually exclusive
intervals (blocks) over its distribution and then check that the average propensity score within
each block is uncorrelated with treatment assignment. Then using this same procedure, we can
also check that each covariate is uncorrelated with treatment assignment within each block.
This obviously means that the balancing property can only be tested in a proximate sense.
Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) and the associated STATA implementation of Becker and
Ichino (2002) is one very widely used algorithm for testing that the estimated propensity score
balances the covariates of treatment status.5
4.1 Stratication
If lemma 1 (the balance property) is satised, a somewhat natural way to compute the treatment
eect then is to take the dierence between the mean outcomes of the treated and control groups
within each stratum of the propensity for which the covariates are balanced, and weight each of
these dierences by the distribution of the treated households across the strata in order to get
the average treatment eect for the treated households. Formally, let i denote the ith treated
household; let j denote the jth control household, and let b denote the bth block (stratum).
Then a block-specic treatment eect is
ATTb = (Nb;1) 1 X
i2I(b)
y1i   (Nb;0) 1 X
j2I(b)
y0j
5The approach works by arbitrarily grouping the data by blocks (intervals) of the propensity score, where
initially the scores within a block are quite similar. An equality of means test between treatment and control
observations is performed for each of the regressors contained in x. If there are no statistically signicant
dierences between treatment and control for each of the covariates in the propensity score regression, then the
regressors are balanced. If a particular regressor is unbalanced for a particular block, then that block is split
into further groups and the test is conducted again. This iterative process continues until all the regressors are
balanced or the test fails.
6where Ib is the set of households in the bth block, and where Nb;1 and Nb;0 are the subsets within
Ib that fall either into the treatment group or control group. To get the average treatment eect
by the method of stratication, we simply weight each of these block-specic treatment eects
by the proportion of treated households falling into each block, and then sum the resulting









One very attractive feature of matching on the propensity score is that we need not assume a
specic functional form for the underlying distribution of the treatment eect since the (average)
treatment eect can be computed semi-parametrically.
One such approach is to match each treated household to the control household that most
closely resembles it. There are various ways in which this can be done, one of which is to match
directly on x, but given Lemma 1, a better way to proceed is to match on the propensity score.
Since p(x) is a scalar index, this method has the advantage of permitting a greater number of
matches than matching directly on x would allow.
Formally, we can dene the set of potential control group matches (based on the propensity




The matching set will usually contain more than one control group household that could po-
tentially feature in the calculation of the average treatment eect. The most restrictive form of
the nearest neighbor method would select a unique control group household for every treatment
group household on the basis of computing the absolute value of the dierence in propensity
scores for every pairwise match considered, and then selecting as a match the jth household
with the smallest absolute dierence in propensity scores. Alternatively, all observations in the
set Ai(p(x)) could be matched against household i. In this case, a dierential weight would be
applied to each match falling into the matching set. The average treatment eect would then
be computed as follows:
ATT
NN = (N1) 1 X
i2fT=1g
(y1i   j!(i;j)y0j)
where j is an element of Ai(p(x)) and !(i;j) is the weight given to j. For the restrictive
one-to-one match mentioned above, we would then have !(i;j) = 1 when j 2 Ai(p(x)), and
!(i;j) = 0 when j 3 Ai(p(x)).
4.3 Kernel Matching
A closely related approach to nearest-neighbour matching is to match non-parametrically using
a kernel function. In this instance our formula for the ATT is as above, but the weight given















where K is the Gaussian (normal) kernel. This method has the benet of using the entire
sample for each prediction with decreasing weights for more distant observations, where the
rate of decline of these weights is determined by . In principle, ! could be determined in other
ways (e.g., tri-cubic, caliper etc.)
74.4 Pipeline Matching
Delays in implementation of a programme may also facilitate the formation of a comparison
group. In these studies, usually termed pipeline studies, the control group comprises those indi-
viduals who have applied for a programme but not yet received it (for example, see Chase, 2002;
Galasso and Ravallion 2004). For example, in PROGRESSA, one third of eligible participants
didn't receive a transfer for 18 months during which they formed control group. Thereafter,
they were phased into the programme. Similarly, in a Kenyan deworming programme studied
by Miguel and Kremer (2004), while 75 schools were chosen to participate, in the rst year of
the study, only 25 schools were treated, while the other 50 schools formed the control group. In
year two, a further 25 schools were phased into treatment and by the third year, all 75 schools
were receiving the treatment. The advantage of this method is that it deals with selection
bias even on unobservable characteristics to some extent, since the successful applicants not
yet receiving treatment will be very similar in most respects to beneciaries of the programme.
A key assumption though in pipeline studies is that the timing of treatment be random given
application.
4.5 Comparison with Randomization
The evidence on whether PSM methods and RE methods produce the same results is somewhat
mixed. Agodini and Dynarski (2004) nd no consistent evidence that PSM can replicate RE
results of school dropouts programmes in the US. In contrast, work by Heckman et al (1997a,
1998) and Diaz and Handa (2004) suggests that PSM works well as long as the survey instrument
used for measuring outcomes is identical for treatment and control participants (Diaz and
Handa, 2004; Heckman et al, 1997a, 1998). A recent study by Diaz and Handa (2007) shows that
with the collection of a large number of observables, propensity score matching can approximate
RE results.
Hence, the success of PSM hinges critically on the data available, as well as the variables
used for matching. The key challenge for PSM methods is to identify all potentially relevant
covariates and dierences between treatment and control groups. If treatment is assigned on
the basis of an unobservable trait, then the estimates obtained will be biased.
The choice of variables should be based on some theoretical reasoning and/or facts about the
intervention and its context, as well as any relevant socio-economic and political considerations.
In this regard, additional qualitative work may be useful (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003b; Godtland
et al, 2004). Ex-post, it is important to test for dierences in the covariates between treatment
and comparison groups to ensure that covariate balance can be achieved (Smith and Todd,
2005a). Importantly, then, PSM estimates will be limited to a matched sample and not the
full sample. However, matched sample estimates tend to be less biased and more robust to
misspecication error (Rubin and Thomas, 2000).
5 Other Non-Experimental Methods
Two potential problems remain unexplored with the propensity score approach. The rst,
discussed already, concerns the possibility of remaining omitted variable biases. The propensity
score regression uses proxies for the unobserved/omitted variables under the assumption that
the omitted variables are redundant in explaining treatment assignment once their proxies are
accounted for. Matching methods are of little use when such proxies do not exist. Observational
studies { even those based on quasi-experimental designs { with this type of problem are said
to exhibit selection on unobservables. This section deals with three widely used alternatives
to randomization and/or matching when we do not observe the full set of variables in
uencing
treatment status: instrumental variable estimation, regression discontinuity approaches and
double-dierencing.
85.1 Instrumental Variables
A key feature of this framework is that unobservables don't bias the treatment eect as long as
an instrumental variable can be found that is non-trivially related to treatment assignment but
is uncorrelated with other variables which are omitted from the outcome equation of interest.
Thus if we are dealing with a \broken" experimental design premised on randomizing treatment,
and we have a concern that not all of the important variables predicting treatment can be
observed given the survey instrument employed, IVs might oer a useful alternative
5.1.1 Wald Estimator: Binary Treatment-Binary IV
Consider once again the single dierence estimator introduced earlier. A regression equivalent
of that estimator is:
yij =  + Tij + uij
where T is our treatment dummy; y is our outcome variable; and i;j indexes villages/PSUs
and households respectively.
A simple alternative to this naive approach is the Wald estimator (Angrist, 1990). This
estimator is a special case of the local average treatment estimator or LATE (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994) where we instrument T with a binary variable.
Let this variable be denoted as Pij. Then as long as Pij does not perfectly predict Tij,
it can be shown that  is simply equal to the ratio of the dierence in means for y (between
households with P = 1 and P = 0) to the dierence in means for T (between households with
P = 1 and P = 0). For the most parsimonious case given above where we use a single IV, the




i=1(Pij    P)(yij    y))
(
PN




i=1 Pij(yij    y))
(
PN
i=1 Pij(Tij    T))
=
 y1    y0
 T1    T0
The complete derivation is given in appendix A1. The standard choice for an IV in this
context is to use some indicator of eligibility.
5.1.2 IV Estimator: Continuos Treatment-Binary IV
Often the rules governing participation in a health program might invalidate the use of eligibility
as an IV. For example, many health interventions are deliberately targeted to poorer segments
of a population. If the outcome of interest is some type of welfare metric (say consumption),
then a model such as the one above will have an implausible exclusion restriction since a variable
such as P is likely to covary with y (the outcome variable of interest). However, exogenous
variation can sometimes by extracted through innovative use of prior information about rollout
or other features of program implementation. For example, if the health programme is targeted
to poor villages but at a centralised location such as a clinic, then spatial information such as
the distance from sampled households to the clinic could in principal be used to construct a
model with more plausible exclusion restrictions.
How exactly might this might work? Let D refer to a measure of distance such as the
one just discussed and let P be dened as in the previous model. Now let's imagine we are
interested in estimating the impact of some health intervention which is best understood as a
\dose".6 As before, denote treatment (this time assumed continuous) as T. Plausibly, D, P
6For example, the treatment for iron deciency anemia ranges from 3-12 months and then has to be com-
plemented for the rest of the patient's life by a more iron-enriched diet than was the case prior to the onset of
treatment.
9and T all belong in the structural model. Individuals that live on the fringes of the village
boundary might be relatively more cut-o from the centre of economic activity so that their
spatial location covaries with their outcomes. Likewise, if the program is means-tested and a
baseline survey is not available, then P might also belong in the structural model. However,
there is no obvious reason to expect that the interaction between D and P belongs in the
structural equation. Thus, a more plausible data sampling process might be:
yij =  + Di + 
Pij + Tij + f(Di  Pij) + vi + ijg
| {z }
composite error
where i = 1;:::;N indexes villages, j = 1;:::;Mi indexes the Mi sampled households in
village i, and vi and ij are project and household-specic error terms respectively. As before,
yij is a measure of consumption. Under this type of data sampling process, if (Di  Pij)
is to be considered a valid IV, we must assume  = 0, otherwise it could be the case that
cov((Di  Pij);uij) 6= 0, where uij = vij + ij. On the other hand, if we assume  = 0, we can
then construct a Wald type of estimator using Di Pij as an IV for Tij. We show in appendix
A.2 that this IV turns out to resemble a Wald type of estimator that consistently estimates the








where yjD;P and TjD;P are dened explicitly in appendix A.2.
5.2 Regression Discontinuity Design
With this approach, researchers take advantage of extant discontinuities that occur as the
result of the policy itself to try and identify the impact of the programme. Discontinuities may
be generated by programme eligibility criteria, thereby making it possible to identify impact
by comparing dierences in the mean outcomes for individuals on either side of the critical
cuto point determining eligibility. For example, in Israel, if a class size exceeds forty students,
a second class is introduced to cater for this increase in student numbers. Hence there is a
discontinuity between the levels of 40 students and 41 students in a grade respectively, or 80
and 81, and so forth. This allows researchers to observe dierences immediately above and
immediately below the threshold level (Angrist and Lavy, 1999). Similar work has been done
in South Africa with respect to welfare responses resulting from access to the state Old Age
Pension which has an age eligibility criteria. Health outcomes for children, girls in particular,
are shown to be signicantly better in households that have pension-eligible members (aged 60
and above) as opposed to households that do not (with household members aged 55-59) (Du
o,
2001). As with PSM, regression discontinuity only gives the mean impact for a selected sample
of participants, namely those in the neighbourhood of the cuto point.
A key identifying assumption is that there is no discontinuity in counterfactual outcomes at
the point of discontinuity. This is made dicult if the discontinuity is generated by an eligibility
requirement that is geographically specic or one that coincides with political jurisdiction, since
this in itself might suggest pre-existing dierences in the outcomes of interest. Moreover, it is
assumed that the evaluator knows the eligibility requirements for participation and that these
can be veried and measured. Where eligibility is based on some criteria such as age, this is
relatively easy to do. However, if eligibility for a programme relies on a means-test, verication
of pre-intervention status becomes more dicult since incomes are only observed ex-post in a
cross-sectional survey. In these instances, a baseline survey helps to control for pre-intervention
dierences.
Buddelmeyer and Skouas (2004) use cutos in PROGRESSAs eligibility rules to measure
impacts of the program and nd that discontinuity design gives a good approximation for almost
all outcome indicators when compared to estimates obtained through randomization.
105.3 Dierence-in-dierence Analysis
This method contrasts the growth in the variable of interest between a treatment group and a
relevant control group. This approach requires that participants be tracked over time, beginning
with a pre-intervention baseline survey, followed up by subsequent surveys of participants and
non-participants. The estimate of treatment impact is given by the dierence in outcomes
for individuals before and after the intervention, and then the dierence between that mean
dierence for participants and non-participants. The key assumption underlying this method
is that selection bias is invariant over time.
Dierence-in-dierence estimates may be appropriate where an argument can be made that
outcomes would not have been dierent over time in regions that received the programme
compared to those that did not, had the programme not been introduced. If this case can
be made, then one can compare dierences in the growth of the variable of interest between
programme and non-programme areas. However, this approach requires long-standing time-
series data in order to ensure that the groups are as similar as possible, and to project that
they would have behaved similarly without the presence of the treatment. Moreover, one must
be certain that no other programmes were introduced concurrently, and that a region may has
not been aected by a time persistent shock that may manifest as a treatment eect (Bertrand,
Du
o and Mullainathan, 2003).
A further benet of the dierence-in-dierence approach is that it can be used to address
bias in the estimates obtained from a randomized evaluation study if there has been selective
compliance or attrition, and they minimize bias that might arise due to measurement error.
Even so, there can be additional biases to the standard errors from using this method. At
the time of the baseline survey, it may not be apparent which individuals will participate in
the programme and which will not, and hence, the researcher must make their best guess
when drawing a random sample for the baseline survey. This may hold implications for sample
representativeness ex-post, so to minimize this source of possible bias, the researcher should
use any information they have about the details and context of the proposed programme to
help guide their sampling choices, and then over-sample from the likely participant group, in
order to ensure a good comparison group. Secondly, the assumption that selection bias is
unchanging over time may also be problematic, especially if changes in outcome variables due
to the intervention are a function of initial conditions which in
uenced progamme assignment
to begin with (Ravallion, 2008; Jalan and Ravallion, 1998). In other words, if poor regions
are targeted for intervention because of their poverty status, and if treatment impact depends
on the level of poverty, this will bias impact estimates. Consequently, the researcher needs to
control for initial conditions in deriving their impact estimates (Ravallion, 2008).
Since dierence-in-dierence estimates require longitudinal data, the researcher will have to
consider the trade-o between relying on a single survey estimate and utilizing PSM to nd a
comparable control group, as opposed to incurring the cost of tracking individuals over time in
order to be able to utilize dierence-in-dierence estimators. Ravallion (2008) argues that such
a decision should be made based on how much is known ex ante about programme placement.
If a single cross-sectional survey is able to provide comprehensive data in this regard, then this
may be a more feasible alternative that collecting longitudinal data.
The dierence-in-dierence approach has been successfully used to provide estimates of
impact in a number of interventions. For example, Thomas et al (2003) show that iron sup-
plementation amongst iron-decient individuals, males in particular, yields improved economic
productivity, as well as improved psycho-social and physical health outcomes. Galiani et al
(2005) use dierence-in-dierence estimates to show that the privatization of water services in
Argentina reduced child mortality.
6 External validity
The non-experimental methods reviewed above may assist in dealing with concerns that arise
over the internal validity of impact estimates based on randomization alone. However, in addi-
11tion to concerns about the internal validity of impact evaluation estimates, concerns may arise
about external validity, and these concerns arise irrespective of the evaluation methodology
adopted. External validity concerns the extent to which results derived from a specic evalua-
tion study can be generalized to other contexts, and whether lessons can be taken away for the
future. In particular, can one expect the same outcomes once the programme is scaled up, and
can policy makers base their own decisions on the introduction of new policies and programmes
on the experience of previous interventions in other contexts?
There are a number of reasons why the answer to such questions may be no. The rst relates
to the fact that estimates for an evaluation study will only produce partial equilibrium eects,
and these may be dierent from general equilibrium eects (Heckman, Lochman and Taber,
1998). In other words, the scale of the programme may aect estimated treatment eects. If an
intervention study is limited to a specic region or area, or if participation is means-tested in
some way, then taking that same programme and replicating it at the national level may lead to
very dierent results. This concern will be even more justied if the success of the intervention
is tied to the existence of specic institutions. For example, if a specic intervention rests on
the activities of a local NGO, then the impact when the programme is scaled up to the national
level may be quite dierent (Du
o and Kremer, 2005). Moreover, scaling a programme up
to the national level may alter the way that markets work, thereby aecting the operation of
the programme itself. For example, a wage subsidy programme tested at a local level may
show promising results, but when this same intervention is scaled nationally, it may alter the
operation of labour markets, and produce a dierent outcome (Ravallion, 2008).
Scaling up may also fail if the socio-economic composition of local participants diers from
the national demographic prole. Randomised interventions tested at a local level tend to
under-estimate how pro-poor a programme will be, since initial benets of an intervention tend
to be captured by local elites (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999). However, as the programme is
scaled up, the incidence of benets tends to become more pro-poor as the benets are extended
to greater numbers of individuals (Ravallion, 2004a).
An obvious diculty of thinking about how generalisable the results from a specic inter-
vention are is that the counterfactual is typically posed in terms of how participants would have
fared in the absence of the intervention. However, policymakers are typically trying to choose
amongst alternative programmes, not between whether to intervene or not. Hence, while a
specic intervention may fare well against a counterfactual of no intervention, it need not be
the case that the same intervention would fare as well when compared against a dierent policy
option.
Concerns over external validity may be ameliorated to the extent that interventions are
replicated in dierent settings and at dierent scales (Du
o and Kremer, 1995; Du
o, 2003).
The results from these replication studies provide evidence on the extent to which results can
be generalized. Since dierent contexts will require adaptations and changes to programmes,
the robustness of the programme or intervention is revealed by the extent to which it survives
these changes. Moreover having multiple estimates of programme estimates in dierent settings
gives some sense of how generalisable the results really are. For example, the ndings from the
mass deworming intervention in Kenya reported by Miguel and Kremer (2004) were largely
vindicated in a study in India, reported by Bobonis, Miguel and Sharma (2002), despite the
fact that the Indian programme was modied to include iron supplementation.
Concerns also arise over the length of the evaluation period. To the extent that the evalua-
tion period coincides with the project period, any impacts that continue after the completion
of the project or only materialize in the long run will fail to be captured in the evaluation. In
short, there may be signicant lags in outcome responses to an intervention. With health care
programs as an example, the interventions will only have eects once better health care out-
comes (BMI, height-weight ratios, incidence of absenteeism, etc) can be denitively measured.
Thus the length of the program hinges on what the outcome variable of concern is, and whether
there is sucient time in the program for there to be a change in the outcome variable. One
solution to this concern is to design an intervention to include the tracking of participants for
a signicant period of time, perhaps even after the programme or intervention has ended. Of
12course, this is costly, but the advantage is that it yields a lot of data that allows one to unpack
the causal mechanisms explaining changes in the outcomes of interest. However, since tracking
may not always be a viable option, an alternative is to simply collect data on intermediate
indicators of long term impact in a cross-sectional survey (Ravallion, 2008).
Crucial to dealing with concerns over external validity is the need to properly understand
the programme context. This requires data, especially administrative data. Data also allows
us to understand the causal processes that underline the dierences in outcomes. A researcher
may collect detailed information about the specic setting, and use survey data to try and
unpack why the outcomes occur as they do, and allow one to infer what might work in a
dierent context. Ravallion (2008) suggests that one should focus on intermediate behavioural
variables and not just outcome variables in this regard. In addition, it is important o have a
process evaluation conducted alongside the evaluation itself, that is, an evaluation of whether
the programme is being implemented as envisaged, whether monies are being spent as they
should, and to obtain feedback from stakeholders that might be used to adapt and improve
delivery on the ground. This kind of data is also vitally important for policy makers considering
going to scale.
Despite these concerns over external validity, policymakers frequently do use lessons from
past successful health policy interventions in designing new policies and programmes. In Sec-
tion 7, we provide a review of some of the existing evidence concerning the impact of health
interventions on individual welfare outcomes. While evidence emanating from Africa is scarce
(with the exception of Kenya perhaps), the available evidence does suggest that health inter-
ventions aimed at combatting geohelminth infections, malnutrition, and iron deciencies have
signicant positive impacts on individual productivity. In terms of other kinds of health inter-
ventions, the evidence is less well-established, suggesting scope for additional research in these
areas.
7 Existing Evidence of Health Impacts
Most evaluations in developing countries that focus on health examine either the uptake of
a certain health input (e.g., such as getting tested for HIV, using a mosquito net, going to
the clinic) or look at ways to change health behavior (e.g. through increased education or
knowledge, bargaining power). However, there are relatively few studies that look at the eects
of health on economic variables such as productivity.
There are several reasons for the limited number of studies on this topic that are related to
both the diculty of this research question itself, as well as the context of Africa itself. As dis-
cussed in detail in section 2 above, causal inference is particularly dicult with estimating the
relationship between health and wealth and there is a vast literature outlining these challenges
(Smith 1999, Strauss 1986, Strauss and Thomas 1998). While randomized controlled trials
provide one research strategy to mitigate the challenges of causal measurement of this ques-
tion, there are additional challenges that make evaluating the relationship between health and
economic outcomes dicult, especially in Africa. We discuss each of these challenges brie
y.
Returns on investments in health often take a long time to realize and often these investments
are made at early ages. Therefore, empirical analyses of the eects of early investments in
health require longitudinal data collection on individuals that can measure health inputs and
productivity after several decades. Alternatively, if only cross sectional data is available, this
requires that data be collected on intermediate indicators of long term success (Ravallion, 2008).
While the number of longitudinal studies in Africa is increasing, the number is still limited.
Existing studies such as the Cape Area Panel Study, the Malawi Diusion and Ideational
Change Study, and the Kenya Life Panel Survey are among some examples of panel surveys
that follow individuals over time.
Other surveys, such as the Demographic Surveillance Surveys, follow individuals over time,
but often lack rich economic data; they instead focus on demographic and health indicators.
Investment in longitudinal studies would help to build our knowledge of long-term eects of
13early health investments. Political stability and funding are two challenges to conducting these
longitudinal surveys, and the studies in South Africa, Malawi, Kenya, and Ghana are examples
of countries that have had stable governments and the presence of researchers; however, more
eort should be made to expand this list and to further understand linkages in other regions
and countries.
There are further challenges to conducting studies that evaluate the causal relationship
between health and productivity. In conducting randomized controlled trials, it is important to
consider ethical implications of withholding some treatment from the control group. Internal
review boards consider it unethical to withhold life-saving treatment from a study population
and thus interventions must carefully consider these implications for the research. For example,
we have limited evidence of the eects of ARVs on economic productivity of HIV-infected
individuals. One of the reasons for this is that it could be viewed as unethical to have a
study population of HIV positive individuals for whom some of them are in a control group,
receiving no ARVs. Researchers who have examined this research question have used quasi-
experimental methods to study the eects of treatment on economic behavior (Habyarimana et
al. 2008; Thirumurthy et al. 2005). In addition to using these non-experimental methodologies,
there are several other possibilities for researchers. First, encouragement designed evaluations
can be conducted where treatment is not withheld from individuals; rather, individuals are
given randomized encouragement such as subsidies or reminders to get their treatment. The
randomized subsidy can then be used as an instrument for the treatment itself. A second
approach that could be useful to explore is to partner with medical randomized controlled
studies to study economic outcomes. For example, following individuals in phase III medical
trials over time could be one promising avenue. If a drug or vaccine is found to be eective,
these individuals could be followed over time to study longer-term eects of good health.
7.1 What have we learned from health evaluations to date?
One of the diculties with evaluating the impact of health interventions on individual welfare
and productivity is the time lag involved between the intervention, often made at a relatively
young age, and welfare outcomes of interest, such as employment, income and poverty status in
adult life. Consequently, in this arena, collecting data on intermediate outcomes such as school
enrollment rates, labour market participation, and test scores aimed at measuring cognitive
ability becomes important. Insofar as positive outcomes in these respects are associated with
better long term prospects as an adult, they provide some evidence for the impact of health
interventions on productivity. In this section, we brie
y review some of the available evidence
concerning the impact of health interventions on individual productivity.7 The evaluation
methods used in these studies encompass the entire range of evaluation methods reviewed
earlier in this paper.
7.1.1 Nutritional supplementation
There is overwhelming and consistent evidence that malnutrition during the early years of a
childs life is associated with lower cognitive levels and academic achievement, as well as higher
dropout rates (Grantham-McGregor, 2007). Malnutrition which occurs in utero, or during the
early years of a childs life can have serious and long lasting impacts on child development
outcomes, and most often manifests itself as stunting. Longitudinal studies in developing
countries have indicated that stunted children are less likely to be enrolled in school (Beasley
et al, 2000), more likely to enrol late (Brooker et al, 1999; Moock and Leslie, 1986), and more
likely to attain lower grades for their age 8 (Moock and Leslie, 1986; Jamison, 1986; Clark et
al, 1990; Hutchinson et al, 1997). Part of the advantage that well nourished children enjoy
is that they enter school earlier and thus have more time to learn, and they also appear to
7This section draws heavily on Burns (2007)
8The relationship between stature and age-appropriate grade is reduced with progression through school,
which is compatible with a higher dropout rate for more stunted children.
14enjoy greater learning productivity per year in the form of school attendance and homework
completion. Young children who are malnourished also tend to show less positive aect, be
less attentive, more apathetic, have poor social skills and have lower levels of play than healthy
children (Gardner et al, 1999; Graves, 1978; Galler and Ramsey, 1989, Richardson et al, 1972).
9
Randomised trials that have provided food supplements to improve the nutritional status
of children have yielded gains of between 6 and 13 developmental quotient points for treatment
children compared to those in the control group with regards to motor development, mental
development and cognitive development (Waber et al, 1981; Grantham-McGregor et al, 1991;
Pollit et al, 1993; Pollitt et al, 2000). /footnote A longitudinal study in Kenya (Sigman et al,
1989) documented that children who were better nourished achieved higher scores on a test of
verbal comprehension and higher scores in Ravens matrices. Improved attention spans were
particularly evident for well-nourished girls. Sigman et al (1991) also examine the extent to
which cognitive abilities of 5 year olds in Kenya was aected by nutritional status. They show
that food intake during the rst two and a half years of life, and physical stature at two and
half, was associated with better cognitive skills at age 5. Less information is available on the
long term benets of nutritional supplementation to children who are already malnourished,
and the evidence that does exist has been the product of 
awed research designs. These include
low take-up of nutritional supplements, small sample sizes, and a follow-up period that was too
short for any real benets to have accrued. However, evidence from a study in Guatemala
where food supplementation was begun during pregnancy and continued until the child was
aged 2 suggest signicant benets, with these infants exhibiting less anxiety at age 6-8 and
greater social skills (Pollitt et al, 1993; Barrett et al, 1982).
Provision of food supplements in the form of school meals may yield additional benets over
and above nutritional benets. There is some evidence to suggest that this may also encourage
attendance at school. Vermeersch and Kremer examine the eect of school meals on school
participation in Kenya, and nd that participation was 30% higher in Kenyan pre-schools
where a free breakfast was introduced, than compared to control pre-schools where no such
intervention occurred. Despite the fact that the provision of meals reduced teaching time, they
also show that test scores were 0.4 standard deviations higher in treatment schools, although
this was only the case if the teachers had good qualications prior to the implementation of the
programme. Alderman et al (1997) nd that in Pakistan, a childs health and nutritional status
is a signicant predictor of school enrolment, and this is particularly the case for girls, thereby
closing the gender education gap. Attanasio and Vera-Hernandez (2007) conduct an evaluation
of a large scale community nursery programme in rural Colombia, which was implemented with
the specic aim of providing nutritional supplementation and childcare to poor households.
10 Attanasio et al (2007) demonstrate that this programme had large and signicant eects,
both on the outcomes of the children, but also in terms of a labour supply eect for mothers
in particular. More specically, they show that a 6 year old boy who had been enrolled in
this programme since birth would be 4.36 centimetres taller on average than boys who had
not beneted from this programme, with an estimate of 4.41cms for girls. Moreover, mothers
whose children were enrolled in this programme were 31% more likely to have been employed
than mothers whose children were not enrolled.
Schultz (2007) examines the impact of the PROGRESSA programme in Mexico, which
9A longitudinal study by Berkman et al (2002) in Peru demonstrates that stunting at age 2 impacts negatively
on cognitive outcomes measured at age 9, while a study in the Philippines demonstrated that stunting at age 2
led to higher drop out rates, later enrolment ages, higher grade repetition, and lower IQ scores amongst children
at age 8 and 11. Walker et al (2005) provide evidence from Jamaica that shows that stunting before age 2 is
associated with lower cognitive abilities and school achievement and higher dropout rates at age 17.
10In rural communities, eligible parents were asked to form local parents associations, and each association
then elected a community mother. The community mother provided the childcare, and received up to a maximum
of 15 children (all children of parents who were members of the parents association) in her home, in return for
which the parents paid a small monthly fee to her. In addition, the state provided funds to provide food which
was delivered on a weekly basis to the community mothers home. The children received three nutritionally
balanced meals a day, lunch and two snacks as well as a nutritional drink. These food supplements were
designed by a nutritionist to provide 70% of the daily recommended caloric intake for these children.
15was designed to allow for a phase-in of conditional cash transfers. PROGRESSA provides cash
grants, given to women, conditional on children attending school regularly and utilising preven-
tative health measures (health care visits, nutritional supplements and participation in health
education programmes). The programme was launched in 1998, but budgetary constraints
made it impossible to roll the programme out nationally. Hence, the Mexican authorities rolled
the programme out randomly, and used this phase-in design to help evaluate the project.11
Schultz (2007) nds that enrollment increases by 3.4% for students in Grades 1-8, with the
increase being larger for girls. In addition, participants who received the transfers enjoyed
improved health outcomes. Gertler and Boyce (2001) demonstrate that the incidence of ill-
ness was reduced by 23% amongst recipient children, and the incidence of anemia was reduced
by 18%. Moreover, children experienced a 1-4% increase in height. Behrman and Hoddinott
(2000) demonstrate that for children aged 1-3 years, those who receive the treatment experience
higher growth rates and are signicantly less likely to be stunted. They estimate that treat-
ment children experience an increase in growth rates of 16% of the mean growth rate relative
to those who do not receive the treatment, and that these eects are larger for children from
relatively poorer households. To the extent that health gains in early childhood translate into
better cognitive development and academic performance at school, better health status and
thus earnings potential as an adult, Berhman and Hoddinott (2000) estimate that exposure to
the PROGRESSA treatment will result in an increase of 2.9% in lifetime earnings.
Given the success of the PROGRESSA programme, similar conditional cash transfer pro-
grammes have been implemented elsewhere. PROGRESSA was replicated in Colombia, al-
though there the programme was called Familias en Accion (FA). In this programme, mothers
of children aged 0-17 were eligible to receive assistance. Beneciary families with children under
the age of 5 are eligible to receive a cash subsidy for nutrition, but to qualify for this, moth-
ers must take their children for regular clinic visits. In addition, mothers are encouraged to
participate in local education sessions on health and hygiene, and contraception. Households
with children aged 6-17 receive a separate monthly grant per child, conditional on the child
attending at least 80% of their classes. Attanasio et al (2005) demonstrate that FA had large
and signicant impacts on school attendance for children aged 12-17, increasing attendance by
10.1% in rural areas, and 5.2% in urban areas. The eect amongst children aged 8-11 was
negligible, and they argue that this is mainly due to the fact that attendance amongst this
cohort was high even prior to the introduction of the programme. FA also increased household
consumption (and thus household welfare) signicantly by 19.5% in rural areas, and by 9.3%
in urban areas, with the bulk of this increased expenditure being devoted to food and clothing
and footwear for children. Since FA requires children to visit clinics regularly, it is perhaps
unsurprising to nd that this signicantly increased the number of children aged 0-2 who had
an up-to-date schedule of health care visits, from 17% to 40%. Amongst children aged 2-4
years, this gure increased from 33.6% to 66.8%. FA also reduced the incidence of diarrhoea
by approximately 10% for children aged 0-4 in rural areas.
In short, the evidence suggests that nutritional supplementation has signicant and positive
impacts on child development outcomes, and may yield added benets in the form of higher
school attendance, better academic performance and lower dropout rates.
7.1.2 Iron supplementation
Walker et al (2007) estimate that 44-66% of all children aged 4 and below in developing countries
suer anemia, with half of these cases being attributable to iron deciencies. Iron deciency
holds negative consequences for child outcomes. From a survey of 21 articles, 19 report that
young children with iron deciency anemia have lower mental, social-emotional, motor and brain
functioning than infants without (Lozo et al, 2006; Grantham-McGregor, 2001). Importantly
though, iron treatment in pre-school aged children with iron deciency anemia has yielded
11While conditional cash transfer programmes have become increasingly popular as vehicles of development,
their success does require that the conditionality be enforced. This involves an additional level of monitoring
and an evaluation of the process.
16positive cognitive benets consistently over a number of studies (Grantham-McGregor and Ani,
2001; Sachdev et al, 2005). There are a number of large-scale trials on iron supplementation
in infants or young children in developing countries, including Zanzibar (Stoltzfus et al 2001),
Chile (Lozo et al, 2003), Bangladesh (Black et al, 2004), Indonesia (Lind et al, 2003) and India
(Black et al, 2002). Four of these aforementioned studies include infants at risk for stunting,
while the fth includes well nourished infants. All ve studies report positive benets of iron
supplementation for motor skills, while the studies in India, Bangladesh and Chile also report
social-emotional benets. Finally, the Zanzibar and Chile studies also demonstrate cognitive
language benets for children receiving iron supplementation. It is worth noting that the
Chilean study yields the largest number of benecial outcomes, and this was the only study to
target healthy infants. 12This simply serves as a reminder that the outcome of an intervention
will in part be a function of the characteristics of the target population.
Bobonis et al (2002) report results from the Balwadi Health project in India, in which they
evaluate the impact of a non-governmental organization (NGO) pre-school nutrition and health
project implemented in Delhi. This programme provides iron supplementation and deworming
drugs to over 4000 children aged 2-6 years, through an existing pre-school network. The pre-
schools in the study were randomly divided into three groups, and the schools were gradually
phased into the program as it expanded over the course of two years. The results to date show
that children in treatment schools gained signicant weight (0.6 kgs on average) compared
to children in control schools, and that average pre-school participation rates increased by 6.3
percentage points among assisted children, reducing pre-school absenteeism by roughly one-fth.
Moreover, they found an almost 50% reduction in the incidence of severe to moderate anemia.
The longer-term benets of iron supplementation are less clear, mainly due to insucient
evidence. The large scale randomised trials suggest that cognitive, social, emotional and motor
development can all be positively aected by iron supplementation, at least in the short run,
which is promising in terms of longer term eects.
In addition to potential eects on school attendance, there is evidence that suggests that
iron supplements have a large eect on productivity of adult workers. Basta et al. (1979),
found increased work output among anemic workers in Indonesia who were given iron supple-
ments. However, while this study was a randomized controlled trial, their estimates are likely
biased upwards due to problems of attrition. Another large-scale study of iron supplements in
Indonesia found gains in adult productivity (as measured by earnings) especially among those
who already had low hemoglobin levels (Thomas et al 2003).
7.1.3 Deworming
Illness due to worms is a problem that aects approximately one third of the worlds popu-
lation, and the incidence of such infection is highest amongst school-aged children (Watkins
and Pollitt, 1987). There are relatively few studies of the impact of worm infections on child
development, and particularly for pre-schoolers, but arguably, poor health due to geohelminth
infections not only has negative health eects but may also limit participation in pre-school
activities. Hutchinson et al (1997) conduct a cross-sectional study of 800 children aged 9-13 in
Jamaica and nd an association between low academic achievement and mild levels of malnu-
trition and geohelminth infections. Oberhelman et al (1998) demonstrate a correlation between
geohelminth infections and poor language development, while Callander et al (1998) show that
treatment of children with trichuris dysentery syndrome produced improvements in mental and
motor development after 4 years. These kinds of statistical associations suggest a compelling
case for interventions aimed at improving school performance in developing countries to target
the health and nutritional status of children. Bleakley (2007) nds that hookworm eradication
campaigns in the southern United States in the early 1900s resulted in increased school enroll-
ment and attendance. In that study, adults exposed to the deworming campaign as children
12It is possible that additional benets were not seen in the other studies that targeted at-risk infants if these
additional benets required complementary activities, such as parental stimulation, nutritional supplements and
so on.
17were more likely to be literate as adults. Other studies in Jamaica and China found deworming
improved children's scores on memory and cognition tests (Simeon et al. 1995; Nokes et al.
1999).Miguel and Kremer (2001) evaluate a programme of bi-annual school based treatment
for worms with inexpensive deworming drugs in Kenyan schools. In this impact evaluation, 75
schools were phased into the programme in random order. They show that health and school
participation increased at treatment schools, but that positive externalities were also generated
for nearby control schools through reduced disease transmission. Absenteeism in treatment
schools was signicantly lower than in control schools, and they estimate that the programme
increased schooling by 0.15 years per treated person. Finally, they also argue that what makes
deworming such an attractive intervention strategy is that it is very cost eective relative
to other interventions that provide free uniforms, textbooks or nutritional supplementation.
13Bobonis et al (2002) nd similar results in India as reported above.
7.1.4 HIV/AIDS
Given the AIDS pandemic across most African countries, this is one area where understanding
the link between health and productivity becomes especially important. There have been a
number of papers that have examined the economic eects of HIV/AIDS or the provision of
ARVs on productivity. These studies are complicated with the diculty of randomizing HIV
status or of ARVs due to obvious ethical issues. Several studies have used other approaches to
examine the long run eects such as matching or using quasi-experimental techniques (Hab-
yarimana et al. 2008; Thirumurthy et al. 2005). Habyarimana et al (2008) nd a signicant
reduction in worker absenteeism in the year following the introduction of ARVS in the work-
place, and argue that for the typical manufacturing rm in East and Southern Africa, the
benet of providing ARV treatment to workers covers up to a third f the cost of treatment. Us-
ing longitudinal survey data from Western Kenya, Thirumurthy et al (2005) show that within
six months of beginning ARV treatment, adult ARV recipients are 20% more likely to partici-
pate in the labour force, and they increase their weekly work hours by a third. Moreover, they
argue that these estimates are, in fact, an underestimate, since in the absence of treatment,
worker productivity would have declined even further. Hence, the upper bound of the impact
of treatment is larger. Thirumurthy et al (2005) also nd that once adult AIDS patients within
the household begin treatment, young boys within the household work fewer hours in the labour
market, thereby potentially yielding positive outcomes for school attendance and attainment.
Evidence concerning the impact of HIV status on child outcomes is scant, but Brown et al
(2000) argue that HIV status in children is associated with delays in language acquisition, and
to the extent that this translates into educational penalties, will aect later labour market
prospects. Moreover, many children have been orphaned by AIDS, and thus nd themselves
vulnerable and often living in chronic poverty. This impacts their developmental potential since
they have reduced access to resources and must deal with a great deal of psychological stress.
Case and Ardington (2006) show that orphans are less likely to be enrolled in school, and if
they are in school, they lag behind children of the same age.
7.1.5 Other health interventions
There are numerous other kinds of health interventions that might potentially also yield pos-
itive impacts on productivity and incomes later in life. For example, the eects of indoor air
pollution due to use of cooking fuel within a household has been suggested to be an important
factor in economic productivity (Du
o, Greenstone and Hanna 2008). Malaria may also reduce
productivity and there have been a number of papers that have examined the eects through
non-experimental methods (Ashraf, Fink and Weil 2009). In terms of supplementation of other
micronutrients, the evidence is either insucient with more randomised control trials being
13Since several programme interventions were conducted in Kenya in similar environments, they are able to
make cost-benet comparisons of these dierent kinds of interventions. They show that deworming costs $3.50
per additional year of school participation, compared to $99 for the provision of free uniforms, and $36 for
nutritional supplementation. (the latter programme was targeted to pre-schools specically)
18needed to make an strong causal statements or the evidence that is available is simply not
compelling. For example, evidence of Vitamin A deciency is scant, and Walker et al (2007)
argue that this can be ignored as a priority since there is little evidence to suggest that vitamin
A supplements would have a large impact on the development outcomes for young children.
By way of contrast, zinc deciencies are estimated to aect one third of the worlds population,
yet the evidence of the role of zinc in child development is unclear. Importantly,zinc supple-
mentation may produce negative outcomes if provided to children who are not lacking zinc to
begin with, since it aects the balance of other micronutrients. However, that being said, zinc
supplementation has been associated with better motor development and behaviour amongst
children in a Bangladesh study (Stoltzfus et al, 2001) but no such eect was found in India or
Indonesia (Grantham-McGregor et al 2007).
Iodine forms part of thyroid hormones and as such, is crucial for the functioning of the central
nervous system. It also aids in regulating physiological processes, and deciency can lead to
mental retardation. Despite a worldwide campaign to combat iodine deciency through salt
iodisation, this deciency is still considered a risk factor. A 1994 meta-analysis of 18 studies of
children and adolescents concluded that IQ scores were 13.5 points lower amongst children with
iodine deciency (Walker et al, 2007). Another meta-analysis in 2005 (based on publications
in Chinese journals) showed that IQ scores were 12.5 points lower for children living in iodine-
decient areas, and who had lived there during their childhood years. Moreover, children who
received iodine supplementation both pre- and post-natally had IQ scores that were 8.7 points
higher on average than children who did not receive such supplementation (Walker et al, 2007).
Finally, a longitudinal study in China suggests that iodine supplementation during the rst and
second trimesters of pregnancy may be more eective than supplementation during the third
trimester, or during infancy.
There have been other studies of potential direct eects of health interventions aimed at
improving water, sanitation and infrastructure. While the number of randomized controlled
trials are increasing, there still only remains a limited number that examine longer term or eco-
nomic eects. Access to clean water and proper sanitation reduces the risk of diarrhoeal disease
for young children. Diarrhoea is especially prevalent during the rst 2 years of life, making it
an important risk factor, although Walker et al (2007) argue that there is no proper evidence
concerning the link between diarrhoeal disease and child development per se. While two small-
scale studies in Brazil suggest there is an association between the incidence of diarrhoea in the
rst two years of life and cognitive outcomes, a larger cohort study in Peru that controls for
other covariates does not nd any such association (Berkman et al, 2002; Guerrant et al, 1999;
Niehaus et al, 2002). The lack of evidence in this regard does not mean that no link exists,
simply that there is insucient documented evidence to be persuasive that an intervention on
this front yields substantial developmental benets.
8 Conclusions
Randomization is often viewed as the ideal method to deal with the problem of selection bias.
When appropriate to the policy context, the results of randomized evaluations are relatively
easy to communicate because they generally do not require substantial qualifying assumptions.
An added advantage is the transparency associated with choosing a control group ex-ante.
However, these advantages of randomization justify its use to the exclusion of other methods
only when interventions are of such a nature that they aect an entire population. In the case of
a health intervention, if participation is rendered mandatory and the intervention is rolled out
randomly across districts, then randomization at the district level will yield population-wide
average treatment eects that are unconfounded by selection bias.
However since participation in health interventions is most often voluntary, randomization
alone is usually insucient. Under this more realistic scenario more explicit modeling exercises
are required to identify treatment eects. Propensity score matching has been shown to be quite
eective when coupled with less-than-perfect experimental designs. Heckman and Smith (1996)
19have also argued that randomizing eligibility could be coupled with instrumental variables. This
type of quasi-experimental design works quite well when the eligibility rules of the program are
not compromised during implementation. When eligibility is correlated with outcomes however,
the analyst might be forced to look for IVs elsewhere. In such instances, detailed knowledge of
the institutional environment as well as the administration of the program could prove useful
in constructing alternative IVs.
While experimental designs are always desirable when evaluating health impacts, they are
not a panacea to all data problems. Identication strategies that rely solely on randomizing
treatment assignment have to contend with the problem of selective compliance and attrition
from both the treatment and control groups. Guarding against such problems will often involve
combining methods and/or building into studies additional rules concerning participation This
may require conditionality to be imposed on participants, as was the case with PROGRESSA, or
may require signicant investments of time and energy by the research team in establishing good
working relationships with survey participants, as well as the ability to maintain contact over
time in the case of longitudinal studies. Moreover, interventions that are simple to administer
and for participants to adhere to have a stronger chance of success than interventions that
require a complex bureaucratic structure in order to be administered, or where the intervention
requires signicant education or time commitment on the part of participants.
Where health investments are made at early ages, longitudinal data is ideally required to
assess longer term health impacts on productivity. When the collection of longitudinal data is
not possible, intermediate indicators of long term success should be collected in cross-sectional
surveys. Given the costs involved in data collection exercises, collecting such data might best
be accomplished by partnering with medical randomized controlled studies.
In sum, the evaluation problem is really one of missing data. The credibility of impact esti-
mates will only ever be as good as the data upon which they are based. Randomized evaluations
that do not control adequately for selective compliance and attrition will necessitate the use
of NX methods as well as substantial collection of good quality data, including administra-
tive and process data to provide important insights about the context and inner workings of
the programme, so that additional analytical options are available if important aspects of the
experimental design of a program are prone to unravelling.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Wald Estimator





i=1 Piyi   (
PN
i=1 Pi) y = N1  y1   N1 y = N1(  y1    y) where N1 =
PN
i=1 Pi is the number
of observations in the sample with Pi = 1 and  yi is the average of the yi over the observations
with Pi = 1. Next write  y as a weighted average:  y = N0
N  y0 + N1
N  y1, where the zero/one
subscripting refers to treatment and control. After some algebra it can be shown that  y1    y =
(N N1
N )  y1   (N0
N )  y0 = (N0
N )(  y1    y0). So the numerator of the IV estimate is (N0N1
N )(  y1    y0).
The same argument shows that the denominator is (N0N1
N )(  T1   T0). Taking the ratio completes
the proof.
20A.2 Derivation of the Probability Limit of the Wald Estimator Using
D  P as an IV
We begin by computing the following conditional expectations:
E(yijjDi = 1;Pij = 1) =  +  + 
 + E(TijjDi = 1;Pij = 1)
+  + E(vijDi = 1)
E(yijjDi = 1;Pij = 0) =  +  + E(TijjDi = 1;Pij = 0) + E(vijDi = 1)
E(yijjDi = 0;Pij = 1) =  + 
 + E(TijjDi = 0;Pij = 1) + E(vijDi = 0)
E(yijjDi = 0;Pij = 0) =  + E(TijjDi = 0;Pij = 0) + E(vijDi = 0)
We will also need to compute:
E(TijjDi = 1jPij = 1)
E(TijjDi = 1jPij = 0)
E(TijjDi = 0jPij = 1)
E(TijjDi = 0jPij = 0)
We can now construct dierence-in-dierence estimators for the eect of D and P on consump-
tion, as well as on the dose variable:
^ yjD;P = [E(yijjDi = 1;Pij = 1)   E(yijjDi = 1;Pij = 0)]
  [E(yijjDi = 0;Pij = 1)   E(yijjDi = 0;Pij = 0)]
^ TjD;P = [E(TijjDi = 1;Pij = 1)   E(TijjDi = 1;Pij = 0)]
  [E(TijjDi = 0;Pij = 1)   E(TijjDi = 0;Pij = 0)]
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The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) conducts research 
directed at improving the well-being of South Africa’s poor. It was established in 1975. Over 
the next two decades the unit’s research played a central role in documenting the human 
costs of apartheid. Key projects from this period included the Farm Labour Conference 
(1976), the Economics of Health Care Conference (1978), and the Second Carnegie Enquiry 
into Poverty and Development in South Africa (1983-86). At the urging of the African Na-
tional Congress, from 1992-1994 SALDRU and the World Bank coordinated the Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD). This project provide baseline data 
for the implementation of post-apartheid socio-economic policies through South Africa’s first 
non-racial national sample survey. 
 
In the post-apartheid period, SALDRU has continued to gather data and conduct research 
directed at informing and assessing anti-poverty policy.   In line with its historical contribution, 
SALDRU’s researchers continue to conduct research detailing changing patterns of well-
being in South Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on the poor.  Current 
research work falls into the following research themes:  post-apartheid poverty; employment 
and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era of rapid social change; public 
works and public infrastructure programmes, financial strategies of the poor; common prop-
erty resources and the poor.  Key survey projects include the Langeberg Integrated Family 
Survey (1999), the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000), the ongoing Cape Area Panel 
Study (2001-) and the Financial Diaries Project. 
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